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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 16-3764 
____________ 
 
DAVID E. GABROS, M.D., 
                       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
*SHORE MEDICAL CENTER; LINWOOD CARE CENTER;  
SCOTT STRENGER, M.D.; JEANNE ROWE, M.D.; PETER JUNGBLUT, M.D. 
 
*(Amended pursuant to Clerk’s Order dated 10/19/2016) 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-14-cv-01864) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2018 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 9, 2018) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 David Gabros, M.D. appeals an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint against Shore Medical Center without prejudice. We will affirm. 
I 
 Gabros sued Shore (and others not relevant to this appeal) in March of 2014, 
asserting a congeries of federal and state claims. After the District Court threatened to 
dismiss his case for lack of prosecution, Gabros first attempted to serve process on Shore 
six months after he filed suit. After another eleven months—during which Shore moved 
to dismiss for insufficient process and insufficient service of process under Rules 
12(b)(4) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—Gabros tried a second time. 
Four months later, after concluding that neither attempt to serve Shore was adequate, the 
District Court gave Gabros “one final opportunity to right the ship” within thirty days. 
App. 39–40. When Gabros failed to comply with that order, the Court granted Shore’s 
motion and dismissed Gabros’s suit without prejudice. 
II1 
 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs service of process, 
requires plaintiffs to serve a summons and a copy of the complaint on each defendant. 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over whether proper 
service was actually made. McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 194 (3d 
Cir. 1998). The choice of remedy for improper service is committed to the sound 
discretion of the District Court. Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 38 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1). The summons has to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(a)(1) and 
corporate defendants must be served consistent with Rule 4(h).  
Here, the District Court held that Gabros failed to effectuate service on Shore 
because the summons was inadequate. We disagree. At least as to Gabros’s second and 
third tries, the record includes a summons that facially satisfies Rule 4(a)(1). It names the 
court and the parties, is directed to Shore as the defendant, states the name and address of 
Gabros’s counsel, provides the time for Shore to appear and notifies it of the 
consequences of failing to do so, is signed by the Clerk of the District Court, and bears 
the District Court’s seal. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(A)–(G).Yet the Clerk initially left 
blank the fields for the defendant and plaintiff’s counsel, which caused the District Court 
to fault Gabros for “reus[ing] the lone blank summons issued by the Clerk” when he 
served each defendant. App. 11–12. 
 Contrary to the District Court’s holding, nothing in Rule 4 requires a summons to 
be signed and sealed by the Clerk only after it is otherwise completed. Rule 4(b) (which 
served as the basis for the District Court’s conclusion) provides merely that the plaintiff 
“may present a[n] [otherwise completed] summons to the clerk for signature and seal.” 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regulate the final form of a summons, not the 
methods by which clerks of court issue them. Indeed, the process followed here, in which 
“the clerk . . . deliver[ed] a blank summons, signed and sealed, [for the] plaintiff’s 
attorney to fill in,” is “common practice[] in many districts.” 1 NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS § 22.04 (Feb. 2017 Update). 
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 Despite our disagreement with the District Court’s reasoning, we will affirm 
because we may do so “for any reason supported by the record.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 
637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he party asserting the validity of service bears the 
burden of proof on that issue,” Grand Entm’t Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 
F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993), and Gabros has consistently failed to establish that he 
served Shore by a method permitted by Rule 4(h).  
 Gabros submitted three proofs of service. And each one, read generously, indicates 
that a process server went to Shore’s place of business and left a copy of the summons 
and complaint with a particular person. The documents were first left with “Barbara 
Defenbeck, Administrative Assistant,” App. 106, and twice later with “Georgette Fox, 
Risk [Manager],” App. 44, 29. The record is bereft, however, of any evidence that either 
Defenbeck or Fox was “an officer, a managing or general agent, or an[] . . . agent 
authorized . . . to receive service of process.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Nor is there any 
basis to conclude that either one was “in charge” of Shore’s place of business and 
therefore a proper target of process under New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(a)(6), which the 
Federal Rules incorporate as a permissible method of service. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
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(h)(1)(A), 4(e)(1). Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
dismissed Gabros’s claims without prejudice. 2 
                                                 
2 Gabros’s suggestion that Shore waived its challenges to service by answering 
and participating in some discovery is without merit. Shore preserved those defenses by 
including them in its answer, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly allow. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“No defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more 
other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading.”). 
In addition, Gabros requests an evidentiary hearing concerning service of process 
on each defendant. Such a hearing is unnecessary because he has failed to show that there 
are any disputed facts that would require an evidentiary hearing. The record discloses the 
identities and/or jobs of the individuals who received the summons, and there is nothing 
before us to create a genuine dispute that those individuals are not officers, managing or 
general agents, or agents authorized to receive service of process as required under Rule 
4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
